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SustainabilityThe development of anti-aging technologies could have dramatic implications for a world already challenged by
population aging. We explore how the world might evolve given the development and deployment of
technologies capable of nearly eliminating mortality and morbidity from most causes. We consider both the
great beneﬁts and some of the complex sociopolitical rebalancing resulting from such advances. We use the
International Futures (IFs) long-term, multi-issue, global forecasting system in our analysis of the interactions
among demographic changes, the related changes in health costs and government ﬁnances, shifts in labor
force participation, resultant economic transformations, and the environmental sustainability of the
dramatically-altered human demands that emerge. We ﬁnd that the widespread deployment of
anti-senescence technologies would cause populations to surge—making fertility rates an issue of tremendous
social import—while a much larger, healthier, labor force would spur economic growth. But this is not a given;
the cost of treating entire adult populations could prove unbearable to non-high-income economies without
signiﬁcant transfers within and across societies. In the absence of new transformative production technologies,
life-pattern ﬁnancing would require the virtual elimination of retirement and a major restructuring of
government ﬁnances. Pressures on the environment would also greatly intensify.
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).1. Introduction
There is near certainty that the world will experience rapid popula-
tion aging throughout this century, thanks primarily to widespread and
substantial reductions in fertility and, secondarily, to ongoing exten-
sions of life expectancy.1 Even as debate persists on biological limits to
life, a growing body of demographic evidence suggests that improve-
ments in human longevity are not diminishing, and may even be accel-
erating at older ages (Willets et al., 2004; Strulik and Vollmer, 2013;
Vallin andMeslé, 2010). At the same time, new breakthroughs in regen-
erative medicine and anti-aging therapies point to the possibility of im-
provements in longevity that are dramatic rather than incremental, and
that reduce morbidity along with mortality (Lucke and Hall, 2006,
2010). Yet, forecasts produced by governmental and intergovernmentalegies for Engineered Negligible
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pandemics, large-scale wars, or
. This is an open access article underorganizations continue to assume a fairly narrow range of upside lon-
gevity variation, amounting to atmost 10 years of added life expectancy.
In this study, we take the opposite approach, exploring a future of very
rapidly expanding life expectancy coupled with very low senescence.
Using International Futures, a large-scale, long-term, integrated fore-
casting system, we explore the demographic, socioeconomic and eco-
logical consequences of, and necessary adaptations to, such a world.
There has been continued debate on whether longevity will contin-
ue to increase at its current rate of one-and-a-half to two years per de-
cade (in high-income countries) for the foreseeable future, or whether
future gains will slow or cease as we approach potential limits to the
human lifespan (de Beer, 2006; Bongaarts, 2006). Olshansky et al.
(2009) and Coles (2004) argued in favor of diminishing gains and an ul-
timate statistical limit due to the need to reduce all-cause mortality by
ever-greater amounts in order to keep increasing longevity—and, in
fact, many past efforts to forecast longevity built in diminishing rates
of progress against mortality at older ages (Wachter, 2003).
On the other side of the debate, Oeppen and Vaupel (2002),
Christensen et al. (2009), Howse (2009) and Vallin and Meslé (2010),
among others, found little evidence for a limit to life expectancy, given
that, over time, the greatest declines in mortality have occurred in
older and older age groups, and also that the rate of mortality decline
has been accelerating for the oldest old as well (Caselli and Vallin,
2001; Strulik and Vollmer, 2013; Willets et al., 2004). Indeed, more re-
cent forecasting efforts, including that of the United Nations Populationthe CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
2 We only touch on some key impactswithin the large and highly integrated IFs system;
for a complete mapping of individual variables and their connections, see the expandable
diagram at http://pardee.du.edu/understand-interconnected-world or documentation of
all IFs models at http://pardee.du.edu/working-papers.
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duced a set of Bayesian forecasts that consider the possibility of far
more rapid increases in longevity (Howse, 2009; Raftery et al., 2013).
The second uncertainty, the health of those experiencing increases
in life expectancy, will play a major role in determining the economic
impact of population aging. Researchers like Klijs et al. (2011), Strulik
and Vollmer (2013), and Payne et al. (2007) point to recent evidence
showing a compression of morbidity even as life expectancies increase;
that is, individuals are living longer andhealthier lives. A continuation of
this trend could prove a tremendous human welfare success story. In
addition, it might prove an economic boon as individuals remain
productive workers longer (or even indeﬁnitely) and need less ex-
pensive medical care for disabilities. If, on the other hand,
Olshansky et al. (2009) and Fries (1980) are right, longer lifespans
will expose more people to the diseases of old age, while continuing
medical advances will allow for increased life expectancies by keep-
ing sick individuals alive longer. In such a world, medical costs could
be much higher. Indeed, the continued accumulation of morbidity at
older ages and the resultant increases in health expenditures are as-
sumed in most baseline forecasts of demographic and health change
(Goldman et al., 2013).
While these uncertainties loom large now, they could be obviated by
the advent of game-changing medical advances, including stem cell
therapies, telomerase-based treatments, tissue engineering, gene-
therapy, and growing rejection-proof organs (Longo et al. 2015;
Kennedy and Pennypacker 2015; Moskalev and Pasyukova 2014).
Thus, it is important to consider the implications of greatly extended
healthy life expectancies (de Grey et al., 2002; Lucke and Hall, 2006,
2010). Few studies, however, have explored the long-term conse-
quences of breakthroughs resulting in dramatic andwidespreadmortal-
ity reduction. This study imagines a world in which such medical
advances occur in the near future and examines their likely
consequences.
In a short paper in 1959, Ansley Coale, the intellectual father ofmod-
ern demographic research, used Alfred Lotka's Stable Population Model
(Lotka, 1998) to demonstrate the surprisingly modest effects of longev-
ity on population size by envisioning a world of immortality with fertil-
ity unchanged. Coale noted that a shift toward immortality would just
have the same long-term impact on population growth as a 10% in-
crease in fertility rates.More recently, Caselli andVallin (2001) comput-
ed the population implications of a world with a life expectancy of
150 years instead of 85. Assuming a convergence of the global total fer-
tility rate (TFR) to replacement level, their high longevity scenario pro-
duced a population of 14 billion in 2100 instead of 11.8 billion, a sizable
increase, though in relative terms it would pale in comparison to the
population growth of previous centuries. In models assuming a conver-
gence to a TFR of 1.0 child per woman, the extension of life expectancy
from 85 to 150wouldmerely delay the inevitable path toward inexora-
ble population decline by 100 to 200 years, depending on the age struc-
ture of longevity changes. Both the earlier and later studies noted that
the more dramatic changes resulting from extreme longevity would
lie with the aging of the population.
None of the aforementioned studies addressed the possibility that a
dramatic increase in longevity might be accompanied by an extended
fecund span, with the potential for further population growth. Given
continued increases in the effective reproductive age through assisted
reproductive technology (ART), any forecast of the long-run conse-
quences of extreme longevity must also consider potential scenarios
for fecundity extension, including the possibility of eternal reproductive
capability.
The purpose of this paper, then, is to consider the issues raised by a
future of very rapidly expanding life expectancy coupled with very low
senescence. More speciﬁcally, we want to look at how the world might
evolve were there to be, over a 20-year period beginning as early as
2020, a rapid development and deployment of technologies that nearly
eliminated mortality and morbidity from disease as well as eliminatinginfecundity.We label thisworld that of a Negligible Senescence scenario
and use the International Futures (IFs) integrated forecasting system to
explore it. We juxtapose this world with a Base Case scenario of more
slowly progressing extension of life expectancy, accompanied by de-
layed but not ultimately reduced senescence (a more common forecast
than that of negligible senescence). Our goal is not to model a likely fu-
ture world, but rather to frame our understanding of the potential con-
sequences of negligible senescence by evaluating the effects of a rapid
and universal transition to such a regime. We thus do not address the
rather obvious likelihood that a rollout of such technologies would be
bothmore incremental and less universally available than our scenarios
suggest.We also do not address the speciﬁc technologies or policies that
might lead to such a scenario.
It is not enough to simply look at ﬁrst order demographic conse-
quences of the negligible senescence scenario, which we know would
be greatly disruptive for societies as a whole (even if the individuals
within them greatly desire it). We also want to begin consideration of
some of the social, economic and ecological changes and adaptations
that societies might experience in such a world—in fact, changes that
they might well ﬁnd necessary.
The next section describes the IFs modeling system, the Base Case
scenarios, and the negligible senescence intervention space. In model-
ing necessary adaptations to a world of negligible senescence, we intro-
duce additional scenario variations relating to fertility, ﬁnancing of life
extension, and ﬁnancing of retirement, as described in Section 2.3.
Section 3 presents results on the comparison of the negligible senes-
cence scenario to the Base Case and comparisons of different scenario
variations within the negligible senescence space. We ﬁrst present pos-
sible impacts on population size and age distribution, exploring three al-
ternate fertility scenarios. We next address health ﬁnance, exploring
three potential cost per life saved scenarios and illustrating the necessi-
ty of subsidies from rich to poor countries to ensure global access. We
then consider the costs of ﬁnancing the general consumption needs of
an older but healthier population. Having addressed these potential
sources of variation, wemodel the impact of a rebalanced Negligible Se-
nescence scenario on economic output environmental sustainability.
2. Materials and methods
The IFs forecasting system used in our explorations has been devel-
oped over the past 35 years and is widely used for long-term analyses of
human, social, and environmental system development. This section
provides a brief survey of the system, sketches the extensions made
for this paper, and introduces the scenarios developed for this analysis.
The IFs system, with all changes made for this paper and ﬁles to gener-
ate the scenarios discussed here, is available for free use atwww.Pardee.
du.edu.
2.1. International Futures (IFs)
The International Futures forecasting system is based at the Freder-
ick S. Pardee Center for International Futures at the University of
Denver's Josef Korbel School of International Studies. IFs includes de-
tailed models of demographic, economic, sociopolitical, education,
health, infrastructure, energy production, and agricultural subsystems
for 186 countries interacting in the global system (see Fig. 1).2 Most of
these models are comparable to, and sometimes more fully developed
and advanced than, other stand-alone models in the issue areas repre-
sented. Extensive linkages connect the separate models of the IFs sys-
tem, providing the ability to analyze the issue area interactions
desired in this paper. The models within IFs that are of special interest
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Fig. 1. Diagram of models within the International Futures (IFs) system.
3 Detailed migration data provided by personal communication from Samir KC.
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nance, and economic systems. Roll-ups of forecasting results to world
regions or income-category groupings reﬂect the aggregation of
country-level results, following aggregation rules appropriate to the
variables (e.g, sums, simple averages, population- or GDP-weighted
averages).
IFs represents population using a standard cohort-component
structure. Five-year cohorts are computationally spread to 1-year
cohorts, and population change due to birth, death, and migration
is computed in 1-year time steps. In order to study extreme longev-
ity, we extended the previously existing 22 age–sex category struc-
ture (up to age 100) to 42 age–sex categories so as to represent
population to age 200+. The native IFs mortality estimates and fore-
casts build on theWorld Health Organization's Global Burden of Dis-
ease (GBD) project (Mathers and Loncar, 2006), including
representation of mortality and morbidity due to 15 causes across
the groupings of communicable disease that can be transmitted
from person-to-person (e.g. HIV/AIDS, diarrheal disease, malaria),
noncommunicable disease (e.g. cardiovascular disease, cancers),
and injuries and accidents, and endogenous forecasts of mortality
change based on distal drivers (i.e., GDP per capita, education, and
time as a proxy for technological advance) and proximate risk fac-
tors (e.g., obesity, smoking, air pollution). Following the methodol-
ogy of the GBD study, IFs represents initial morbidity as a ﬁxed
product of mortality for each cause of death. Subsequent changes
in the level of morbidity relative to mortality are controlled by a
multiplier that allows for greater or lesser accumulation of morbid-
ity among survivors. Mortality and morbidity then impact economic
growth through pathways of labor force participation, productivity,
savings, and health expenditure. All model initializations, including
age–sex structures, fertility and mortality rates are speciﬁed sepa-
rately for 186 countries with IFs project estimations to ﬁll data
holes as necessary.
In the current study, for adults we introduced parametric control
over the mortality J-curve for each cause, using a logistic expression to
control the timing of mortality (moving the J-curve horizontally) andthe pace of mortality increase with age (making the J-curve steeper or
ﬂatter) for each mortality cause as follows:
P Mortð Þ ¼ a e
βage
1þ a eβage
On the fertility side, IFs calculates change in age-speciﬁc fertility of
women in response to income, income distribution, infant mortality,
education levels, and contraception use. To account for the potential ex-
tension of fecundity well past the typical onset of menopause in current
populations, we added a parametric structure that builds age-speciﬁc
fertility as a function of the age of menarche, age of menopause, peak
age and level of fertility, and the pattern of rise and fall from the peak.
Migration rates for the IFs population model are drawn from exoge-
nous forecasts provided by the International Institute for Applied Sys-
tems Analysis, but IFs maintains global balances in population ﬂows
(KC and Lutz, in press-a,b).3 The rates generate fairly stable foreign pop-
ulations as a share of total populations, the pattern of recent decades.
The IFs economic model represents the economy in six sectors, as il-
lustrated in Fig. 1: agriculture, materials, energy, manufacturing, ser-
vices, and information and communications technology. The model
computes and uses input–output matrices that change dynamically
with development level. It is a general equilibrium-seeking model that
does not assume exact equilibrium exists in any given year; rather, it
uses inventories as buffer stocks and to provide price signals so that
the model chases equilibrium over time. A Cobb–Douglas production
function (following insights of Solow, 1956, 1957 and Romer, 1990) en-
dogenously represents contributions to growth in multifactor produc-
tivity from human capital (education and health), social capital and
governance (domestic security, low corruption, democracy), physical
and natural capital (infrastructure and energy prices), and knowledge
development and diffusion (research and development and economic
integration with the outside world). Finally, a Linear Expenditure
System represents changing household consumption patterns as a
function of income.
Our analysis of the implications of longevity and aging depends heavi-
ly not just on the demographic and economic models included in IFs, but
also on the representation of ﬁnancial ﬂows. IFs represents eight catego-
ries of government spending (military, health, education, R&D, two cate-
gories of infrastructure, foreign aid, and a residual category) plus transfer
payments. The model represents the need to maintain some long-term
equilibrium between government revenues and expenditures and en-
forces trade-offs across categories of government expenditures. It also
uses a social accounting matrix to integrate government ﬁnancial ﬂows
with those of households and ﬁrms domestically and internationally so
as to assure system-wide balances and tradeoffs.
2.2. IFs Base Case scenario
All scenarios build on the IFs Base Case scenario. The Base Case is not
a simple extrapolation of variables inmultiple issue areas, but rather the
dynamic, nonlinear output of the fully integrated IFs system. For exam-
ple, IFs forecasts of key drivers, such as GDP per capita and education at-
tainment of adults, are foundational underpinnings of its Base Case
health forecasts. Further, changes in assumptions concerning health re-
sult in changes in demographics, economics, and all other systems in IFs.
Feedback loops across the many components of the IFs system mean
that interventions may accelerate further beneﬁcial or detrimental
change in health and other modeled aspects of human development.
Hughes et al. (2009: 56–71) explored the key IFs forecasts, compar-
ing them to others, such as those of the United Nations Population
Division and the World Bank. As a general rule, the IFs Base Case pro-
duces behavior quite similar to medium variant or base forecasts of
such analyses (see also Hughes et al. (2011) for health model results).
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Fig. 2. Negligible Senescence (NegSens) scenario space. Note: The solid arrows represent scenario alternatives explored in Section 3. The dashed arrows represent the scenarios branches
explored in the Rebalanced Scenarios. TFR Source: authors' conception.
4 The link of mortality change to change in morbidity in the NegSens scenario is less
than 100% only for injuries/accidents (75%) and mental health (no link).
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reaching consequences of a systemic shock like the introduction of a
Negligible Senescence scenario.
2.3. Negligible senescence scenarios
Fig. 2 describes the scenario tree for subsequent analysis. Relative to
the Base Case scenario described above, we ﬁrst introduce a core
negligible senescence scenario (hereafter referred to as “NegSens”) in
which all mortality and most morbidity (with the exception of mental
health) is reduced to near zero.We then build variations on theNegSens
so as to explore alternative possible implications of the scenario and
social adaptations that could arise to address imbalances the
scenario(s) might create. Speciﬁcally we address variation relating to
intervention cost, fertility adaptation, and life cycle work/ﬁnance
patterns. We then explore the implications of our combined scenarios
on economic growth and sustainability outcomes.
2.3.1. Negligible senescence scenario
NegSens and its variants all include a 20-year phase-in period
between 2020 and 2040 during which all noncommunicable disease
(NCD) and communicable disease (CD) mortality is reduced to close
to zero, as is morbidity due to all of these causes except mental
health, We chose this pattern because it illustrates a particularly
sharp and dramatic break with the Base Case. Although we did
not reduce mortality and morbidity for mental illness, we placed
limits on the extent to which the burden of mental illness
would rise with age. We also assumed a great reduction in inju-
ries and accidents, positing that individuals and societies with
low levels of other mortality would make special efforts to decreasethese.4 In addition, model parameters allow variations to the core
NegSens scenario with respect to starting point, period of phase-
in, magnitude of reduction in mortality and morbidity, geographic
scope of changes, costs of associated treatments, and much more.
In our NegSens scenario set, we assumed universality in the phase-in
within and across countries. Althoughwe recognize that this is unlikely
given the presumably high costs of necessary medical treatments, this
assumption again allows themost extensive exploration of implications.
Rather than impose a particular structure of technological diffusion
across countries or incomegroups,we instead explore the cost subsidies
that such universality would require, both within and across countries.
Fig. 3 llustrates the extent of this mortality reduction relative to the
Base Case. In the Base Case, continued aging of the global population
into ages of higher mortality will begin to reverse the long-term global
decline in crude death rates, thereby slowing population growth. The
negligible senescence scenario instead drives crude death rates close to
zero, with no eventual rise, effectively eliminating rather than delaying
death. Since crude death rates are a principal contributor to population
growth rates, the relative decrease in crude death rates from 9–11 deaths
per 1000 (or 1% per year) to near zero would add an extra 1% to
population growth each year, with substantial economic implications.
Population growth and aging could increase competition for resources
in the social accounting matrix, particularly relating to retirement. The
reduction of morbidity would increase the economic productivity of
individuals and reduce health costs. The ultimate extent of these effects
would depend in large part on changes in fertility behavior, costs of the
negligible senescence intervention itself, and possible adjustments to
life cycle work/ﬁnance arrangements.
Fig. 3. Crude death rates globally, Base Case and NegSens scenarios. Note: 1960–62 omitted because the Great Leap Forward in China distorted the mortality pattern. Source: IFs version
7.09.
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Within the NegSens scenario we explore three fertility patterns and
compare them to our Base Case fertility assumptions. In the Base Case,
global total fertility rate (TFR) declines to 1.9 children per woman, all
births occur to women between ages 15 and 49, and the mean age of
childbearing rises only slightly to 32, compared to 29 today. For biological
and behavioral reasons, this pattern would be unlikely to hold in a world
of negligible senescence. Instead, negligible senescence technologies
could also potentially delay or even eliminate age-related infecundity,
leading to increased fertility at older ages, particularly in the initial post-
intervention years. At the same time, the age of initial and peak fertility
would likely be pushed back substantially in anticipation of longer life.
Our primary or core scenario of interest is a Middle Fertility NegSens
scenario in which TFR temporarily rises (as a result of extended fertility
without intentional behavioral changes) before ultimately falling to 1.9
children per women, but with a much delayed age pattern in which the
mean age of childbearing rises to 58 (see Fig. 4). Our subsequent analysis
also explores a LowFertility NegSens scenario inwhich TFRdeclines to 1.0
children perwoman (with amean age of 51) due to some combination of
a reduced sense of self “replacement” and “old-age care” needs and of so-
cietal needs to limit fertility substantially to slow the rapid population
growth of the underlying scenario. Finally, we explore the possibility of
a more substantial increase in fertility due to rising fecundity; the
NegSenswithHigh Fertility scenario assumes a gradual rise to a TFRof 3.0.
2.3.3. Health expenditure estimation and variations
In the core NegSens scenario, we assume that life extension treatment
costs of $100,000 per treatment and provide, on average, 20 years of neg-
ligible senescence; assuming subsequent treatments on the same sched-
ule, the cost per person–year of healthy life is $5000 per person–year
(in the 2011 constant dollars of the model). We also introduce alternate
scenarios in which the treatment instead guarantees 10 or 30 years of
negligible senescence, thus implying costs per person–year of healthy
life amounting to $3333 and $10,000. The $100,000 is based on the aver-
age cost per patient for a number of advanced medical treatments that
potential life extension therapies might resemble, including: molecularly
targeted cancer drugs, gene therapy treatments, a recent protease inhibi-
tor treatment, and the cost of the telomerase supplement TA-65.5
Assuming the necessity of subsidies or cost-shifting by providers,
treatment costs are proportionately scaled down for countries with GDP5 The annual cost of the selected molecularly targeted cancer therapies ranges from
$60,000–$240,000 in US 2010 dollars (Sikora, 2007; Torres, 2010). The annual cost of
the selected gene therapy treatments ranges from $30,000–$340,000 (Wade, 2011;
Hirschler, 2012). The protease inhibitor treatment cost is $57,200 per year (Liu et al.,
2012), and the annual cost of the TA-65 supplement is $8000 (de Jesus et al., 2011).per capita below that of the US in 2010, to 5% of high-income country
levels as aminimum. In current programs such as the global antiretroviral
treatment (ART) campaign for HIV/AIDS, this downward scaling in effec-
tive price for poor countries is generated by a combination of direct trans-
fers from donors; discounts from innovators to buyers; and voluntary,
and compulsory licenses of innovator property to lower-cost producers.
Based on data from the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief
(PEPFAR), the current mean cost of ART per patient–year for lower- and
lower-middle-income countries in 2013 was $642 when taking into ac-
count all sources of support, while for upper-middle-income countries
the mean cost was $941 (PEPFAR, 2013). When compared with average
person–year treatment costs in the US of $20,000 (Maxmen, 2012),
low-income and lower-middle-income countries pay 3.2% of the US cost
while upper-middle-income countries pay 4.7%. All of these cost reduc-
tions effectively constitute transfers from wealthy to rich countries.
We further posited decline in person–year costs in real terms to one
fourth of the initial cost (to $1250 annually in constant 2011 dollars in
the core scenario) over 80 years to 2100, a reduction of 1.7% annually.
Relative to growing GDP per capita, this would mean a quite rapid and
very substantial decline in economic burden. All in all, our cost assump-
tions appear quite optimistic and higher ones would exacerbate the is-
sues we raise below.
For the purposes of this study, we further enhanced the IFs ﬁnancial
model by explicitly representing the ﬁnancial cost of person–disease–
years of morbidity (by cause) and of last-life-year and also by
representing the costs of life extension and of “other” health costs
(e.g., administration and R&D) related to morbidity, mortality, and life
extension. These bottom-up calculations of total health costs will not
be equal to top-down calculations of what governments and private cit-
izens have historically beenwilling or actually able to expend.While the
model is capable of allowing societies to over- or underspend relative to
potential costs, with consequences for health outcomes, our analysis as-
sumes that top-down expenditures will match bottom-up costs,
allowing us to assess the implications of alternative cost structures for
government ﬁnance and societal ﬁnancial ﬂows more generally.6
2.3.4. Life-pattern ﬁnancing
Additional structural extensions and new parameters allow us to
control changes in household work and saving patterns and in govern-
ment pension spending as mechanisms for satisfying life-pattern6 The alternative to balancing bottom-up costs and top-down expenditures would be to
allow societies to fall short of spending needs, resulting in some functionally speciﬁed re-
duction in societal health. Since this paper focuses on a society in which negligible senes-
cence has been achieved, we assume the costs are met by expenditures and evaluate the
consequences for the social accounting matrix.
Fig. 5. Population globally by fertility scenario, 2010–2100. Source: IFs version 7.09.
7 We note that a TFR of 1.9 can be achieved through an endless variety of age-speciﬁc
fertility patterns, with considerable implications for short-termpopulation growth though
not for long-run population growth rates. In the unlikely case that the age pattern
remained the same as in the Base Case, the population in 2100 would rise to 16.7 billion.
Fig. 4. Alternative life cycle fertility patterns in Base Case and NegSens Scenarios. Source: IFs version 7.09.
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starting age and retirement age in replacement of the prior ﬁxed values
in the IFs system; computing the annual consumption needs of the
elderly, both in terms of annual ﬂows and long-term stocks (assuming
a ﬁnite life horizon); and building mechanisms for the balancing of life
course ﬁnances through endogenous adaptations and exogenous
adjustments to retirement age, private savings rates, and government
transfers to retirees. Due to the complexity and interdependence of
these interventions, we describe them iteratively in Section 3.3.
3. Results
3.1. Population size and structure
We ﬁrst explore the demographic consequences of NegSens relative
to the Base Case to illustrate the quantitative nature of the intervention
and its consequences for population change. The Base Case produces a
total global population in 2100 of 10.1 billion, very slightly down from
a peak reached in 2090 (see Fig. 5). Compare this with 10.8 billion
(and still rising slowly) in the median variant forecast of the United
Nations Population Division's, 2012 Revision, and with a range in fore-
casts from the International Institute of Applied Systems Analysis (KC
and Lutz, in press-b) from 6.9 to 12.6 billion (9.0 billion in its
centrally-oriented Shared Socioeconomic Pathway 2 scenario).
NegSens produce substantial increases in population size, growth,
and aging relative to the Base Case, though the extent of changedepends considerably on fertility patterns. The NegSensMiddle Fertility
scenario with a TFR moving to 1.9 (as in the Base Case) produces a
population of 14.8 billion in 2100, with an annual growth rate of 0.6%
in 2100.7 The NegSens Low Fertility scenario would slow population
growth relative to the NegSens Middle Fertility scenario, though the
population in 2100 would still be considerably higher than that in the
Base Case at 11.6 billion, and population would still be growing at
0.2% in 2100. The so-called High Fertility scenario would lead to what
most observers would consider a demographic and sustainability night-
mare, with more than a doubling of population relative to the Base Case
and continued rapid rise. Our subsequent analysis focuses on the
NegSens Middle Fertility and NegSens Low Fertility scenarios.
These alternative fertility scenarios, in interaction with NegSens
mortality patterns, produce rather shockinglydifferent age–sex structures
in 2100 (see Fig. 6). NegSens High Fertility produces a general shape
much like that of the world today, although its overall size ismuch larger.
NegSens Low Fertility produces an almost inverted pyramid (or child's
top) form, one that would become substantially more pointed over still
more time, reﬂecting ever greater numbers of 100+ people. By 2100,
73.5% of the world's population would be over age 65 in NegSens Low
Fertility, compared to 58.5% in NegSens Middle Fertility, 25.7% in the
Fig. 6. Population globally in 2100 by NegSens fertility scenario. Source: IFs version 7.09.
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negligible today and still just 0.7% in 2100 for the Base Case, would
reach 29.4% in NegSensMiddle Fertility or 37.7% in NegSens Low Fertility.
3.2. Health care costs and expenditures
The changes made to the IFs model structure for this project
facilitate our analysis of the trade-offs, across both time and countries,
of health cost increases associated with NS treatment and health cost
reductions resulting from improved health. Fig. 7 displays the net health
spending in three NegSens cost scenarios and compares that to total
spending in the Base Case.
In the Base Case scenario, the IFs model forecasts that health expen-
ditures related to mortality/morbidity would continue their decades-
long rise from 10.6% of global GDP in 2014 to 12.4% of GDP in 2050, be-
fore eventually undergoing a gradual decline due to the deceleration of
aging processes and ﬁnancial limitations, but also reﬂecting the compo-
sitional effects of the growing global share in developing countries
where expenditures are lower.
The IFs Base Case forecasts for total health spending are quite close
to existing forecasts in the literature. The Organization for Economic
Co-operation and Development (OECD), for example, forecasts that
total public spending on health by its mostly high-income member
countries will reach 13% of GDP by 2050; in the IFs Base Case, OECD
member-country spending reaches a similar 15% of GDP by 2050. At
the country level, Keehan et al. (2011) forecast total health spending
in the United States to reach 19.8% of GDP by 2020; in IFs, spending in
the US in 2020 is the identical percent of GDP. Similarly, Besseling and
Shestalova (2011) forecast public health spending in the Netherlands
to be 10% of GDP in 2015, while IFs has it reaching 10.9% of GDP.
While disease-speciﬁc expenditures would decline in the NegSens
set, all three scenarios would entail a high level of expenditure on re-
generative treatments themselves, and these costs would be heavily
front-loaded during the initial rollout period, peaking in 2040 at 5.4%
of global GDP when priced at $5000 per person–year of healthy life (at
3.6% of global GDP using the $3333 price; at 11% of global GDP with
the $10,000 price).
The time proﬁle of net ﬁscal impact in NegSens would thus vary
greatly depending on the intervention costs. Assuming the median orcore cost estimate of $5000 per person–year, at the global level the neg-
ligible senescence treatment would become cost-neutral relative to the
Base Case by 2022. If the cost were twice as high, however, the treat-
ment costs on top of other ongoing health costs would rise to just
under 14% of global GDP in 2034, an increase of 2.6% age points, and
would only become cost neutral by 2044. In all of theNegSens scenarios,
costs of mortality and morbidity would fall to near zero before seeing a
gradual rise (beyond the time horizon of Fig. 7) due to the slow accumu-
lation of mental illness among a continuously aging population.
As the four panel display by county-income level shows in Fig. 7,
global analysis masks signiﬁcant differences in themagnitude and tem-
poral impact of treatment costs between high-income and developing
countries. Upper-middle-income countries, for example, see their total
health care costs as a percentage of GDP more than double, from just
over 6 percent in 2020 to 14% in 2040, with a break-even point of
2060. Lower-middle- and low-income countries see costs triple over
the same period, only becoming cost neutral toward the end of the cen-
tury. In the medium-cost NegSens, most developing countries would
see costs rise by 2 to 3 percentage points, and lower-middle- and low-
income countries would see break-even points several decades after
those of high-income countries.
The values in Fig. 7 are, however, misleadingly low because of the
assumption that treatment costs in developing countries would be
subsidized in some way, falling domestically to as little as 5% of those
of high-income countries. At their peak in 2030, those subsidies or
transfers add an additional 4.8% of GDP to the global total in the core
NegSens with medium treatment costs, and 14.5% to the high-cost
treatment scenario, while the low-cost scenario sees a modest increase
of 1.6 percentage points even with the subsidies (Fig. 8 adds those
subsidy costs back into the global total). That still makes the medium
scenario appear potentially globally affordable with a peak of 16.2% of
GDP directed to health in 2030. One might think that the world could
rise to that challenge given the life-expectancy stakes. (The high-cost
scenario would peak at 27.6% in 2035, and that is a challenge we
would not expect to be met.)
The apparent affordability of the core or medium-cost NegSens
scenario raises the question, however, of who would pay the subsidies
and whether those payers would, in fact, view them as acceptable. In
low-income countries, foregoing the subsidies would increase the
Fig. 7.Morbidity, mortality and life extension costs without covering subsidies as percent of GDP, globally and by World Bank country economy classiﬁcation, comparative scenarios.
Notes: The Base Case scenario shows total cost ofmorbidity andmortality (last life year); the NegSens low, medium, and high cost scenarios add the additional cost of life extension treat-
ments to decreasingmorbidity and mortality costs. Subsidy payment is assigned to no country. The four panels show countries grouped by theWorld Bank's income group classiﬁcation;
see http://data.worldbank.org/about/country-and-lending-groups for a list of countries in each income category (URL accessed 12/10/14). Source: IFs version 7.09.
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Obviously the world would look to the high-income countries. If those
countries paid their own life extension costs plus the subsidies to the
rest of the world, their costs would rise to 24.7% of GDP in 2034. Even
paying their own costs would require political and social will to arrange
substantial domestic transfers. Asking high-income countries to nearly
triple the percentage of GDP spent on health so as to pay much of the
cost in low- and middle-income countries would likely receive a
negative answer.
3.3. Life pattern ﬁnancing and economic growth
The contemporary world already struggles with the ﬁnancing of old
age. Many developing countries, including giants like China and India,
have yet to set up pension systems that fully cover rapidly agingpopulations that once relied upon children for support of the elderly.
High-income countries tend to have such systems, but many are based
on deﬁned-beneﬁts rather than deﬁned-contributions and are proving
inadequate in the face of even current rates of longevity increase and
growth in proportions of the elderly. Richer countries have barely
seen average retirement ages rise in the face of often substantial
protests and the voting power of the elderly and their supporters
(Ebbinghaus and Hofäcker, 2013; Komp, 2013; Preston, 1984). Higher
lifetime incomes and extensive retirement plans have often actually
encouraged younger retirement ages.
Given the immense consumption needs facing aging populations,
how might populations and insurance systems adapt during a major
increase in longevity andhealth?At least in the early years of adaptation
there would likely be a combination of confusion, denial, and inertia
across even high-income, technologically advanced societies with
Fig. 8.Morbidity, mortality, and life extension costs globally (adding back in subsidies) as percent of GDP, comparative scenarios. Notes: The Base Case shows total cost of morbidity and
mortality (last life year). The NegSens low, medium, and high cost scenarios add the additional cost of life extension treatments including international subsidies to decreasingmorbidity
and mortality costs. Source: IFs version 7.09.
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would occur in stages and unequally across society. Moreover, the
already strong political position of the elderly would become increas-
ingly and fairly rapidly even stronger as mortality and senescence
were forced back.
The top panel in Table 1 shows that the Base Case increases in con-
sumption needs of elders would be trivial next to those observed in
NegSens scenarios. In the Base Case, the share of GDP needed to support
the consumption of retirees would double from 8.2% today to 16.8% in
2100. In that situation, even in the absence of increased retirement
age, the model endogenously identiﬁes a pathway to meeting future
consumption needs—namely, the savings rate rises substantially from
22.4% today to 28.4% in 2100, and the share of global GDP devoted to
government pensions climbs from 6.4% to 8.4%. The resulting solutionTable 1
Key indicators of global life-pattern ﬁnancing and balance, 2010 and 2100 in the Base Case
compared to NegSens scenarios with and without rising retirement age.
Without rising retirement age
2010 Base
2100
NegSens
TFR = 1.9
2100
NegSens
TFR = 1.0
2100
Retiree consumption need as % of GDP 8.2 16.8 51.8 66.7
Savings rate (%) 22.4 28.4 28.9 33.3
Government pensions as % of GDP 6.4 8.4 16.6 17.2
Retiree consumption gap as % of GDP 0.0 1.1 30.5 43.6
Labor force participation rate (%) 46.3 43.2 23.6 16.2
Government revenues as % of GDP 34.4 33.7 49.5 48.9
With rising retirement age
NegSens TFR = 1.9
2100
NegSens TFR = 1.0
2100
Retiree consumption need as % of GDP 15.7 16.6
Savings rate (%) 29.1 29.9
Government pensions as % of GDP 13.7 14.2
Age of retirement 113.6 117.8
Retiree consumption gap as % of GDP 2.03 2.3
Labor force participation rate (%) 42.4 44.6
Government revenues as % of GDP 46.4 45.4
Note: All NegSens scenarios here use the mid-cost or the core NegSens scenario. Life-pat-
tern ﬁnancing and balancing scenarios include changes to retirement age, labor force par-
ticipation rates, and pensions.
Source: IFs version 7.09.for the Base Case yields a modest gap between old-age consumption
needs and actual consumption, amounting to just 1.1% of GDP.
In contrast, no reasonable combination of increased government
pensions and household savings could meet the retirement needs of a
negligible senescence population unless retirement ages were to rise.
In NegSens (shown also in the top panel of Table 1), the share of GDP
needed to meet the consumption of retirees rises to 51.8% in 2100
with a 1.9 TFR and to 66.7%with a 1.0 TFR, largely in parallel with trajec-
tories in thedependency ratio. Themodel partially adapts endogenously
to these shifts by introducing a substantial increase in domestic savings
rates (28.9% if TFR is 1.9 and 33.3% if TFR is 1.0) and the share of GDP de-
voted to government pensions (to 16.6% if TFR is 1.9 and 17.2% if TFR is
1.0). Both of these shifts are facilitated in part by a declining burden of
health expenditures, but they nevertheless strain other aspects of public
and private ﬁnance and push total government revenues in 2100 from
33.7% of global GDP in the Base Case to 49.5% of GDP. Even changes of
this magnitude do little to close the old-age ﬁnancing gap, which re-
mains at 30.5% of GDP with moderate fertility and 43.6% of GDP with
low fertility. In other words, it would be impossible to manage a
world of negligible senescence in the absence of substantial increases
in the age of retirement.
We therefore next introduced a rebalancing model in which the age
of retirement was allowed to move up gradually in response to the gap
between retirement consumption needs and availability of funds from
accumulated savings and government transfers. Rather than impose a
particular set of assumptions about a sudden jump in retirement age,
we introduced one possible path toward a gradual increase in retire-
ment age that was geared to balancing out the consumption gap. The
transition identiﬁed by themodel involves some substantial extensions
ofworking life near the endof the negligible senescence phase-in period
(2040), followed by longer-term continuing adjustments. We also as-
sumed that people living indeﬁnitely in good health might choose a
work pattern less clearly shaped by the life course, dropping out period-
ically for recreation or retraining, very likely cutting back the intensity of
work life, and often eschewing paid employment when ﬁnances
allowed. As a result, we also introduced a gradual reduction in work
force participation at all ages from 100% to 80%, phased in over the
20-year intervention period.
The resulting proﬁle, shown in the bottom panel of Table 1, illus-
trates one possible path to closing the old-age consumption gap. Al-
though solutions could be achieved through an inﬁnite set of
combinations of private savings, public ﬁnance, and delayed retirement,
Fig. 9. GDP and GDP per capita at PPP (US$2011), comparison of Rebalanced NegSens scenarios and Base Case, 2010 and 2100. Note: Rebalanced NegSens scenarios here use the mid-cost
or the core NegSens scenario with life-pattern rebalancing changes to retirement age, labor force participation rates, and pensions. Source: IFs version 7.09.
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successful cases. For the moderate fertility scenario, the age of retire-
ment reached 114 by the year 2100, raising the workforce participation
ratio from just 23.6%without rebalancing to 42.4%, basically in line with
the Base Case. The lower proportion of retirees reduced the retiree con-
sumption as a share of GDP from 51.8% to 15.7%, again in line with the
Base Case. This particular solution saw savings rates remain quite high
by historical standards (29.1%), though still barely higher than in the
Base Case. The rebalancing reduced the share of GDP devoted to pen-
sions from 16.8% to 13.7%, which was still substantially higher than
the present-day share (6.4%) or the share for 2100 identiﬁed in the
Base Case (8.7%).
Perhaps the most striking result of the rebalancing exercise is the
relatively limited effect of fertility on the ultimate life-pattern ﬁ-
nancing solution, in contrast to our current era in which old-age ﬁ-
nancing needs are driven heavily by changes in fertility and the
resultant size the of the working population supporting the retired
elderly population. In NegSens, the elderly would bear overwhelm-
ing responsibility for meeting their own consumption needs. In
fact, it should be noted that by 2100 the retirement age would still
be on a trajectory of linear increase, rising about 0.6 years for eachcalendar year. In essence the calculation of retirement age by that
time is largely just an artifact of our ﬁnancial balancing calculations,
and the very concept would be steadily phased out as the population
aged. Instead it would be replaced by changing participation rate
patterns, reﬂective of alternative basic technological capabilities of
society on the production side, of alternative life style consumption
patterns, and of income and wealth distribution.
With the rebalancing of life-pattern ﬁnancing in place for the
medium cost or core NegSens scenario (see Fig. 2 for a review of
the scenario development sequence of this analysis), we can consid-
er resulting change in economic growth relative to the Base Case, as
shown in Fig. 9. The Rebalanced NegSens scenarios (both medium
and low fertility variants) would result in dramatically larger global
economy sizes, largely because population would be so much great-
er. The Base Case has global GDP reaching $866 trillion by 2100
while in the Rebalanced NegSens scenario with medium fertility
global GDP reaches $1697 trillion. The Rebalanced NegSens scenari-
os would also yield modest but positive effects on GDP per capita
even with a much larger global population. Assuming nomajor envi-
ronmental constraints, the Base Case would already see global GDP
per capita rise from $12,900 to $86,000, while the Rebalanced
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moderate fertility and $119,000 with low fertility. In annualized
terms, these gains relative to the base are quite modest.
3.4. Sustainability
The demographic and economic shifts discussed above cannot help
but affect the use of natural resources and the state of the natural
environment. Although the effects would be widespread, we focus
here on issues related to energy use and climate and crop production
and undernutrition as examples of broader implications.
In the IFs Base Case, global energy demand increases by a factor of 5
between 2010 and 2100.8 In the Rebalanced (and medium-cost)
NegSens scenario with a TFR of 1.9, that increase becomes close to a
factor of 8 (and a factor of 7 with a TFR of 1.0), as shown in Fig. 10.
Given that Fig. 9 indicated GDP growth in these two scenarios by factors
of 19 and 15 by 2100, it should be clear that themodel assumes dramat-
ic reductions in the use of energy per unit of GDP as a result of efﬁciency
increases and demand pattern changes.
The impact of increased energy demand on the climate system
depends very much on how this demand is met. The IFs Base Case
tends to be optimistic compared to other recent literature in terms of
the shift tomore non-fossil fuel sources; it forecasts a plateauing of fossil
fuel use in the 2030s followed by a steady decline after 2040, with non-
fossil fuel sources overtaking fossil fuels just before mid-century and
constituting 92% of all supply by 2100.9 Such reductions in fossil fuel
use might be even more difﬁcult to achieve given the much larger rela-
tive size of the economy in the NegSens scenarios. Thus, we explored a
variation to the basic NegSens Rebalanced (andmedium cost) scenarios
in which growth in non-fossil production is cut back somewhat and
more fossil fuel production is added; the additional fossil fuel is coal be-
cause the resource constraints on coal are much less than those on oil
and gas. Even in this adjusted scenario, non-fossil fuel sources overtake
fossil fuels in their contribution to meeting demand shortly after 2050,
with just 18% of all energy coming from fossil sources by 2100.
Even the scenarios without higher coal production have substantial
impacts on atmospheric carbon levels, as shown in Fig. 11. Although the
levels are only slightly higher than those in the Base Case, they pass
600 ppm(ppm) in 2100—well above the 450 ppm that have been posited
as an important target level so as to limit globalwarming. Forecasts of car-
bon concentration are, however, highly sensitive to the composition of in-
creased energy supply. Just themodest shift from renewable to fossil fuel
production laid out in the High Coal scenario variants of Fig. 10 would in-
crease atmospheric carbon concentrations by about 30%, to 818 ppm in
2100 for the moderate fertility scenario and 791 ppm for the low fertility
scenario, with little sign of peaking any time soon.
Of great concern also might be the demands on agricultural
production in NegSens and the implications for undernutrition. Fig. 12
shows that, in the Base Case, global mean calories per capita rise from
2821 in 2010 to 3294 in 2100—not without some negative
consequences for global obesity rates. In the Negligible Senescence
scenario with moderate fertility, by contrast, calories per capita barely
rise at all (2841) while even in the low fertility scenario the level only
rises to 2910. Put another way, between 37% and 99% of all expected8 This is in linewith theBaseline scenario in the recentGlobal Energy Assessment (GEA)
(Johansson et al., 2012) using the MESSAGE model. The Baseline scenario in the GEA,
which uses the IMAGE model, projects signiﬁcantly slower growth, with only around a
doubling of global energy demand over this period.
9 This pace of transition to renewables is slightlymore conservative than that of the ex-
pert panel tapped by TechCast (www.techcastglobal.com accessed 12/10/14), and it still
results in non-fossil fuels contributing close to 90% of total global energy in 2100. By com-
parison, in the Baseline scenarios of the Global Energy Assessment, non-fossil fuel sources
contribute only 20–25% of total global primary energy in the year 2100 (Johansson et al.,
2012). The MESSAGE model does produce a fossil/non-fossil breakdown similar to that
seen in IFs, but only in scenarios with a strong sustainability focus. At the same time, total
energy use is signiﬁcantly lower in those scenarios, so the absolute growth in energy from
non-fossil sources is much less than in the IFs Base Case.gains in caloric consumption could be eliminated as a result of NegSens.
Since calories are not evenly distributed, the results for rates of under-
nutrition look evenmore striking.Whereas the Base Case sees the global
rate of undernutrition declining from 13% in 2010 to 4% in 2100, the
NegSens scenarios would see this rate only drop to 10% with moderate
fertility and 9% with low fertility.
4. Conclusions
Using the International Futures system, a large-scale integratedmodel
of global futures, we have built an experimental scenario of a world that,
thanks to technological advances between 2020 and 2040,movesmortal-
ity and morbidity from their current pattern to one of negligible senes-
cence. Our scenario and variations on it portray an arbitrary set of
assumptions, but ones that facilitate analysis and can be varied using
the International Futures system. We have explored the larger conse-
quences of that scenario and, in the process, elaborated a vision of a negli-
gible senescenceworld.Wenote thatwhile any speciﬁc scenario thatwe or
others present is highly unlikely, there is increased interest among biolo-
gists and economists in understanding the potential returns to health sys-
tems and societies from targeting aging itself rather than focusing on the
physiological consequences of aging.
We ﬁnd that a world of negligible senescence would pose a num-
ber of immense challenges that go well beyond increased population
size. The most obvious and immediate challenge lies with dissemi-
nating and paying for the life-saving intervention set itself. We esti-
mate that rollout of such an intervention on a widespread basis
would be infeasible even in the wealthiest countries if the initial
price were set at $10,000 per year of healthy life added. At the
price of $5000 per added healthy-life-year that we assumed through
much of this paper, the initial ﬁnancial burdens would be manage-
able for wealthy countries and would, over time, yield considerable
reductions in disease-related expenditures that would more than
offset the cost of the intervention. Yet poor and also middle-
income countries would struggle to ﬁnance such an intervention
even if, as we assumed, up to 95% of the costs in the poorest countries
were defrayed through price reductions of the sort that have recent-
ly been observed for high-impact antiretroviral treatments.
With these caveats in mind, a world of negligible senescence would
likely yield a still growing population of 14.8 billion by the year 2100, a
considerable increase over the 7 billion today or the 10.1 billion forecast
in our Base Case in 2100. Uncertainty in fertility, arising from the potential
pronatalist impact of increased fecund spans and, on the other hand, the
public interest in reducing fertility to check population growth, could
yield a population with as many as 20 billion (with a global TFR of 3.0)
or as few as 11.6 billion (with a TFR closer to 1.0). It is important to note
that the 1.0 to 3.0 births per women implied in these scenarios would
have to be spread out over 150+ years of fecund life span instead of the
current 30-odd years. The societal burden of managing population size
while also acknowledging the right to fertility at advanced ages would
be great and pose considerable ethical challenges. In the absence of mor-
tality, even incremental increases in TFR above the levels modeled in this
paper would quickly generate unimaginably high levels of population.
A revolutionary jump in human longevity would require a compara-
ble revolution in the meaning and timing of retirement. The IFs system
can endogenously solve the problem of increased old-age dependency
in the Base Case through a combination of increased savings and public
pensions, even in the absence of any increase in the age of retirement.
No such solution can be found in a world of negligible senescence. In-
steadwe explore scenarios thatwould see the average age of retirement
rising to 114 by 2100 if fertility remained moderate at a TFR of 1.9 chil-
dren per woman, or to 118 if fertility instead dropped to 1.0. Even these
relatively aggressive increases in retirement age necessitated a rise in
savings from 22% today to 29% and doubling public pensions as a
share of GDP, from 6% to something more like 14%. These increases
would seem to be at the absolute edge of feasibility, and thus our
Fig. 10. Energy production from fossil fuels and non-fossil fuels by alternative NegSens and coal production scenarios in 2010 and 2100. Source: IFs version 7.09.
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lower bound. On a positive note, individuals would still be able to
enjoy decades of post-retirement life if they so chose, or embark on
new patterns of employment, education, and leisure that are less de-
ﬁned by imminent mortality than the current pattern.
Finally, our results point to perhaps the greatest challenge facing a
world of negligible senescence, those relating to the sustainability of our
natural resources and biosphere. Given widespread concern that our
economic way of life is already unsustainable, the potential addition of
billions of people would concern many, especially given that this
population (in the absence of negative feedbacks from environmental
constraints)would see aGDPper capita 30% above the already substantial
economic growth built into our Base Case. Energy demand levels, even
with quite optimistic assumptions about efﬁciency gains and renewable
contributions, would drive atmospheric CO2 levels above 600 ppm and,
if coal were more heavily drawn upon without carbon sequestration, to
800 ppm or above. In the absence of food production technologies that
are currently not on the forecast horizon, it might become nearlyFig. 11. Carbon dioxide in the global atmosphere, parts per million by alternativeimpossible to reduce the portion of the world's population that is
undernourished.
It is interesting to note that a massive reduction in fertility by nearly
one-half (from 1.9 to 1.0 children per woman) would substantially re-
duce all of these environmental effects while having surprisingly little
impact on old-age ﬁnance (retirement age would have to rise to 118
versus 114 in the medium fertility scenarios).
Given the preliminary nature of our investigation, we note several
key limitations to address in further exploration. First, for the purpose
of simplicity, we have assumed no variation over time in the effective-
ness of the intervention, whereas amore complete studywould explore
a variety of rollouts with gradually increasing effectiveness. Second, al-
though we run the model for every country, we explore few cross-
country variations except tonote that the global dissemination of the in-
terventionwould not be possible without considerable price reductions
or other subsidies. A more explicit approach to representing dissemina-
tion would be to model the rollout of intervention coverage in each
country, dependent on that country's ability to pay for and deliver theNegSens and coal production scenarios 2010–2100. Source: IFs version 7.09.
Fig. 12. Global calories per capita and undernutrition, by NegSens scenario in 2010 and 2100. Source: IFs version 7.09.
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ethnical and political implications of the emergence of great
life-expectancy inequality between populations receiving or not
receiving the interventions. Third, our exploration of ecological
challenges does not explicitly address the potential for the environment
to put hard limits on growth of economies or overall well-being or to gen-
erate possible collapses in such growth. Fourth, our model and paper do
not explore some of themore disturbing and difﬁcult-to-quantify aspects
of extreme longevity relating to ethics, thepsychic burdenof extreme lon-
gevity, or the potential consequences of disease pandemics. While our
model does assume a gradually accumulating burden of mental health
morbidity, there ismuchwe cannotmodel or predict about such a funda-
mental change to the human experience. Finally, we have not considered
the potential for billions of additional long-lived and healthy humans to
help address any or all of the above challenges.
We may have limited social control over how much life will be ex-
tended and howhealthy those extra years will be (technological change
will largely drive these). But our analysis suggests that we will have
many difﬁcult social choices tomake around demography itself (includ-
ing social approaches to fertility rates), on global ﬁnancing of and access
to health care (including the diffusion of life extension technologies topeople within and across countries that cannot afford them), on
incentive structures around work and savings patterns (including how
to trade-off working life, savings, and government support), and on
the sustainability issues that are already of concern today.
We recognize our portraits of the future and human choiceswithin it
to be inevitably and potentially greatly ﬂawed. We hope that they can
also be thought provoking.
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